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Abstract 
A generic tactical model is developed considering the third parties price policies for the optimization of 
coordinated and centralized multi-product Supply Chains (SCs). To allow more realistic assessment of 
these policies in each marketing situation, different price approximation models to estimate these 
policies are proposed, based on the demand elasticity theory, resulting in different model 
implementations (LP, NLP, and MINLP). The consequences of using the proposed models on the SCs 
coordination, regarding not only their practical impact on the tactical decisions, but also the additional 
mathematical difficulties to be solved, are verified through a case study in which the coordination of a 
production-distribution SC and its energy generation SC is analyzed. The results show how the 
selection of the price approximation model affects the tactical decisions. The average price 
approximation leads to the worst decisions with a significant difference in the real total cost comparing 
with the best piecewise approximation.   
Keywords: Coordinated Management, 3rd Party, Supply Chain Planning, Pricing Models, 
Demand Elasticity. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A Supply Chain (SC) is constituted by a set of echelons: suppliers, storage facilities, 
production plants, distribution centers, and markets (retailers), which are located in different 
geographic sites, linked together through distribution systems, and interacting with third 
parties. When all these echelons belong to one single organization, the SC may be managed in 
a “centralized” way, and some coordination is necessary to harmonize the resources flow 
among these echelons, and their third parties. Supply Chain Management (SCM) aims to 
optimize the performance of a SC (e.g., its financial revenues), establishing how and when: the 
resources flow between echelons, raw materials should be transformed into 
intermediate/final products, and finally the final products should be distributed to customers.  
In recent years, the competitiveness among global SCs has grown resulting in new 
challenges in the area of Process System Engineering (PSE) which include an enhanced 
management of the chemical supply chain. In this sense, the European Petrochemical 
Association (EPCA) as well as the European Chemicals Industry Council (CEFIC) have 
suggested that improving SCM at all levels will increase business competitiveness (McKinnon, 
2004). Among the SCM developments that have been proposed to reduce the SC cost and to 
increase profitability are: effective distribution of resources over the SC network (Shah, 
*Manuscript (for review)
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2005), collaboration and coordination between SCs (Papageorgiou, 2009; Hjaila et al., 2015), 
cooperation and competitiveness (Zamarripa et al., 2013, 2014), robustness (Laínez-Aguirre 
et al., 2015), and incorporation of demand management and corporate financial decisions 
(Shapiro, 2004; Grossmann, 2005). 
 These issues can be addressed at different hierarchical decision levels, through 
designing the SC (Laínez et al., 2009; Mellichamp, 2013), providing an improved master plan 
(Amaro and Barbosa-Póvoa, 2009; Zeballos et al., 2012; Cao et al., 2013; Zeballos et al., 2014; 
Zamarripa et al., 2014; Hjaila et al., 2014,2015), and/or controlling the involved operations 
(Guillén et al., 2006; Sung and Maravelias, 2007; Shah and Ierapetritou, 2012), as will be 
discussed later. 
This work makes a specific emphasis on the tactical decision-making level of 
centralized SCs. More specifically, efficient SCs Coordination (SCsCo) that deals with all 
echelons (i.e., supplier’s echelons, production echelons) as full SCs, taking into account the 
decisions of the third parties which becomes a challenging problem as enterprises seek 
competitive performance.  
SCsCo has been studied from different perspectives; one of the more appealing 
approaches intends to integrate different hierarchical SCM decision-making levels within a 
single SC model. For instance, Laínez et al. (2009) integrate the strategic and tactical levels 
within a single flexible model, representing the manufacturing process recipe, and 
considering all possible feasible links and material flows. Several ways to address this 
management integration problem at the lower levels of the decision-making hierarchy have 
been proposed, as in the work by Guillén et al. (2006), where an enterprise budgeting 
approach following a cash flow formulation for a multi-product SC is proposed. Sung and 
Maravelias (2007) develop an integration approach for multiproduct process networks, 
where the operational model is developed and solved off-line to obtain convex approximation 
functions of the production costs and production levels. Shah and Ierapetritou (2012) extend 
the single site formulation proposed by Li and Ierapetritou (2010) for multi-site multi-
product multi-purpose batch plants. But neither these works, nor any other work addressing 
the integration between the different SC hierarchical levels, consider the coordination among 
different echelons (with their respective SCs) of a global SC structure at the same level (i.e., 
tactical level) taking into consideration the main objectives of all these participating 
echelons/SCs, including the decisions related to third parties. 
The need of effective SCsCo also appears when several SCs with different 
policies/objectives work together, such as the case of closed-loop SCs, where the coordination 
between forward and reverse flows is required on one side, and between their respective SCs 
and the third parties on the other side. In closed-loop SCM, this coordination should be 
introduced into the model formulation by considering the recovery processes and the reuse of 
the final products, where the final demand is satisfied by both new and remanufactured 
products. In this way, Amaro and Barbosa-Póvoa (2009) develop a closed-loop tactical model 
considering that the retail price and demand of final products are uncertain; however, the 
final product price is considered as uncertain parameter independently from the quantity 
demanded along the planning time horizon. The closed-loop formulations are also applied to 
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SCM integration models, such as in Zeballos et al. (2014), who propose an integrated strategic 
and tactical multi-period multi-product closed-loop model for a 10-layer SC network (forward 
and reverse flows). Notwithstanding, the aforementioned closed-loop models aim to optimize 
the global objective resulting from the coordination between the direct and reverse flows, 
disregarding the individual objectives of the participating echelons SCs and their third parties, 
which may lead to inadequate decision-making.  
The coexistence and coordination of different individual objectives have been 
analyzed using approaches based on the Game Theory, such as in the work of Hjaila et al. 
(2015), who represent the individual objectives as non-cooperative non-zero-sum Stackelberg 
game considering the risk associated with the uncertain nature of the third parties. Yue and 
You (2014) develop an integrated strategic and tactical bi-level model for the optimization of 
non-cooperative multi-echelon SC considering the objectives of both customers and 
manufacturers (highest profit) under the leading role of the manufacturer; however, their 
approach considers that the manufacturer echelon dominates the decision-making process, 
disregarding the individual objectives of the suppliers’ echelon SC. Along the same line, Cao et 
al. (2013) propose a coordination mechanism considering the individual goals of the 
participating actors through “revenue sharing” based on Stackelberg game for a SC network of 
one manufacturer and many retailers considering a penalty cost when production cost and 
demand are disrupted; to solve the competence among different retailers, the model is solved 
as a game under the leading role of the manufacturer, while the retailers act as followers: the 
manufacturer offers the retailers a set of contracts (sale prices and revenue share), and each 
retailer chooses its preferred contract. Garcia-Herreros et al. (2015) coordinates multiple 
independent markets through bi-level optimization, in which the upper level problem 
maximizes the revenue of the producers, while the lower level problem minimizes the market 
expenses.   
However, none of these models considers the financial policies of the suppliers’ SCs 
and their third parties when providing the leader decision-making, which may affect the 
outcome of the game. In summary, most of the previous tactical SCM approaches consider that 
all the echelons of the SC share a common global objective (centralized), while the detailed 
behaviors of the third parties participating in the resources and information flows of the SC of 
interest, with their own objectives, are usually neglected, or reduced to a single parameter in 
the optimization models. Few others explicitly consider these third parties’ objectives, but 
without enabling any degree of freedom in their modeled behavior to represent their capacity 
and consequently to control their own performance. But, in practice, the SC network will seek 
its own objectives based on its independent characteristics and economic incentives, 
disregarding the impact of the third parties especially that of business partners on its 
decisions and vice versa which may lead to sub-optimal decisions from a global point of view. 
In this sense, SCsCo that is able to synchronize activities between the participating echelons 
SCs on one hand, and between them and their third parties on the other, all participating in a 
global SC framework, is necessary in order to optimize the total system’s performance. 
Therefore, in order to enhance the competitiveness in the global market, SCsCo should 
incorporate the financial issues of the third parties, such as their price policies, in the 
decision-making process of the interacting centralized SC enterprise, based on the trade-off 
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between the 3rd parties marketing and the SC functions. In this context, economic issues are 
usually considered as the main driving force for decision-making and, since demand is a price 
sensitive variable (Viswanathan and Wang, 2003), price discounts are used as a way to face 
global market competitiveness. The use of price discounts may lead to a higher demand 
which, in turn, will probably allow negotiating lower resources prices for the SC of interest. 
Price discounting is thus an essential strategy to be considered during SCM, since it is able to 
lead to more effective solutions through appropriate SCsCo.  
Prices, as dynamic marketing variables, affect the products’ demand, and thus any 
pricing decision will affect the market. To the best of our knowledge, only few PSE models in 
the literature consider financial issues based on pricing decisions: Weng (1995) started to use 
the demand elasticity as a discounting methodology, facilitating the equilibrium between the 
selling price of a manufacturer and the quantity demanded by different homogeneous 
retailers. Viswanathan and Wang (2003) use the quantity discounts methodology based on 
demand elasticity for single-vendor single-retailer distribution channel. They assume that 
both vendor and retailer act independently to maximize their own profits, the vendor is 
offering price discounts to the retailer, and unlike Weng (1995), the equilibrium point is 
determined by the solution of a Stackelberg game. Wang (2005) extends the traditional 
quantity discounts, which are based on market orders, by including the markets' annual 
volume for the SC two-echelon distribution. However, all of the aforementioned literature 
focuses on simple SC structures, disregarding the arising complexity when many echelons are 
participating in the SC of interest, including different competitive third parties, with their own 
policies. The links among several SCs within a global network are characterized by their 
economic transactions, and they are mainly modeled by average fixed parameters or based on 
price elasticity of demand at the final markets, disregarding the pricing behavior of the third 
party’s resources leading to less efficient tactical decision-making, which may affect the whole 
SC equilibrium. Finally, none of these works integrate the third parties financial policies in the 
global SC decision-making as part of the modeling procedure at the tactical SCM level, which 
will be the focus of this paper. 
So, in order to perform this analysis, and to improve the coordination among different 
echelons SCs in a production-distribution SC network and different competitive third parties, 
a decision-making framework is proposed to integrate the information of the resource flows 
as full SCs within the global SC structure and using this framework, the resources and 
financial flows of the third parties are considered as an extra degree of freedom by using 
different price approximation models to estimate the price policy of each participating third 
party. The different third parties compete through their different price polices (with price 
discounts based on demand elasticity theory). These approximation models are based on 
fixed, piecewise, and polynomial price vs demand functions. Different LP, NLP, and MINLP SC 
tactical management optimization models result from each one of these approximations, all of 
them focus on the minimization of the global SC total cost as an objective function. In order to 
more clearly assess the effects of these different models in the resulting decision making, a 
centralized global SC decision structure is considered for this study.  
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The resulting models are also applied to a case study from a global multi-product SC, 
which takes into account the coordination of a power generation SC with a production/ 
distribution SC, with their RMs competitive suppliers (third parties) own price policies. The 
different proposed pricing models are used to approximate each third party price policy, and 
the systems are solved using different optimization packages according to the type of each 
model towards the global SC objective function. The results are analyzed to assess the 
efficiency of these alternative approaches and their consequences over the achieved optimal 
tactical decisions. The decisions resulting from each pricing model are studied in details to 
analyze the ability of these models to capture the competitiveness among the different third 
parties, and how this affects the global SC tactical decision-making (RM purchase, production, 
storage, and distribution levels).  
This paper is divided into 5 sections. The introduction presented the motivation and 
the state of the art of this work. The second section includes the problem statement 
description and mathematical models. The case study and the models implementation are 
described in the third section. The fourth section thus includes the results and discussions. 
The final section summarizes the conclusions and the future research lines emerging from this 
work.   
2. Problem statement and modeling strategy 
2.1 Problem description and third parties price policies 
This paper tackles a centralized global multi-echelon multi-product SC, with two main 
echelons SCs: the supplier production-distribution SC and the manufacturer production-
distribution SC; each one is represented as a SC management problem with its own entities 
(production, storage, distribution centers, and wastewater treatment plant “WWTP”). The SC 
produces final products to satisfy final market demands using raw materials (RM) from 
competitive third parties and intermediate product/s from the supplier echelon SC. The 
supplier echelon SC produces intermediate products to the production echelon SC and final 
product/s to final markets using RMs from competitive third parties (Figure 1).  
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Figure 1- Global SC network and 3rd parties 
Each third party has its own price policy (Figure 2), which depends on the quantity 
demanded by the global system. And since these real policies are hard to model, different 
price approximation models are developed to estimate the price policy of each third party. 
 
Figure 2- Price policy of 3rd party 
2.2 Coordination modeling basis 
A generic tactical SC model is developed as a basis to test all pricing models. The 
model is characterized by the presence of multi-product SCs in one global SC network. These 
SCs, within the global SC, receive, transform, store and deliver resources from/to other 
echelons SCs belonging to the same global SC organization or to third party’s entities (external 
SCs: resource suppliers, clients, waste & recovery systems, etc.). The tactical base model 
incorporates all information of the participating SCs in the global SC structure, including the 
third parties SC´s. The main objective is to achieve optimal coordination between these 
echelons SCs on one side, and between them and the competitive third parties on the other 
side, towards a common objective: to satisfy the final markets demands with minimum global 
cost. Within the coordination management framework, each echelon SC is able to play 
different roles (e.g. market in one SC and supplier for other echelons SCs along the global SC). 
The suppliers SCs produce intermediate products to the production/distribution SCs without 
any economic incomes, as they both belong to the same owner. The generic base model is then 
extended to include the trade-off between the external resources prices (3rd parties) vs. 
demands through different price modeling strategies. The proposed models are developed to 
provide a tactical master plan, including all resources flows through the global SC network 
nodes and the 3rd parties (i.e. resources purchase, price, distribution, storage, and production 
levels).  
2.3 Mathematical model 
The general SC coordination problem is formulated following the tactical model 
described by Zamarripa et al. (2014), which has been conveniently modified and adapted for 
the purpose of this paper. To represent the coordination framework within a centralized SC 
perspective, a set of echelons (e= e1, e2… En) and their corresponding new subsets, linking the 
P
ri
ce
  
Quantity demanded  
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RMs, products, DCs, production plants, and markets to their corresponding echelons SCs are 
considered along the generated model.  
Eq. (1) represents the coordination framework through the internal 
demand/production trade-off coherence between the suppliers and the production echelons, 
where the internal demand
, ,r e tDmi ¢ is calculated as a function of the production levels. , ,r r eprf ¢
is a production factor that depends on the efficiency of a production echelon to produce 
resource r (final product) using resource ´r (intermediate product) based on an utilized 
recipe (Zamarripa et al., 2014); R is the set of resources produced and demanded internally or 
externally (intermediate/final products).  
, ', , , , ,r e t r r e r e t
r R
r r
Dmi prf prod¢ ¢
Î
¢¹
= ×å                                                                   
; ' ; ;r R e E e E t T¢" Î Î Î Î  
(1) 
The total external demand , ,r e tdmd ¢ represents the final markets' satisfaction from the 
distribution centers as stated by Eq. (2), where M represents the external markets echelon, 
, , , , ,r e e t r e t
e E
e e
D dmd¢ ¢
Î
¢¹
=å                                                          ; ; ;e M e DC r R t T¢" Î Î Î Î  (2) 
Eqs. (3) and (4) represent the minimum and maximum capacity constraints of the 
production and storage entities, respectively. 
min max
, , , ,e t r e t e t
r R
PRD prod PRD
Î
£ £å
                                                                    
; ;e pl e E t T" Î Î Î
 
(3) 
min max
, , , ,e t r e t e t
r R
ST ST ST
Î
£ £å
                                                                             ; ;e DC e E t T" Î Î Î  
(4) 
The total profit of the global SC (Eq. 5) is calculated as the difference between the total 
sales and the total costs of each echelon SC. 
–e e
e E
PROF SALE COST
Î
=å    (5) 
The total revenues of each echelon SC eSALE can be calculated by multiplying the 
retail price of the final product by the quantity of products demanded by the external markets 
(Eq. 6) 
, , , , ,r e t r e t
t T r R e M
e eSALE rp dmd¢ ¢
¢Î Î Î
= ×ååå                                                                              e E" Î  (6) 
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The objective function Eq. (7) corresponds to the minimization of the total cost of the 
global SC along the considered planning horizon T (resources purchase, production, storage, 
transport total costs, respectively).  
e e e e
e E
COST CRM CPR CST CTR
Î
= + + +å                                                                         (7) 
The total production cost 
eCPR is calculated by multiplying the total production 
, ,r e tprod by the unit production cost ,r euprd (Eq. 8) 
, , ,.e r e t r e
r R t T
CPR prod uprd
Î Î
=åå                                                                                 e E" Î  (8) 
The storage cost eCST  of the resources (RM, internal product, and final product) is 
computed built on the unit storage cost ,r eust of resource r in DC each planning time period t 
(Eq. 9).   
, , ,e r e t r e
t T r R
CST ST ust
Î Î
= ×åå
                                                                                          
;e E e DC" Î Î  (9) 
The transport cost eCTR  is calculated in terms of the travel distance ,r edist for each 
resource and the unit transport cost ,r eutr  (Eq. 10). , ,r e tQR represents the transported 
resources each time period t. 
, , , ,e r e t r e r e
r R t T
CTR dis utrQR
Î Î
= × ×åå
                                                                                         
e E" Î  (10) 
The external resources acquisition cost
eCRM from the third parties is calculated in 
function of the quantity demanded ( , ', ,r e e tQ ) and price ( , ',r e tP ), as in Eq. (11), which depends 
on the selected pricing model, Where S refers to the external resources suppliers (third 
parties). Eq. 12 represents the total resources purchased from the third parties for the 
centralized SC.  
', ', ,
'
, ,r e t r t
t r R S
e
e
e e
T
CR EM P Q
Î Î Î
= ×ååå                                                                                       e E" Î       (11) 
, ', , ', ,r e t r e e t
e E
Q QE
Î
=å                                                                             ; ' ; ' ;r R e S e E t T" Î Î Î Î                                        (12) 
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Herewith, the third parties prices , ',r e tP  are considered as degrees of freedom in the 
generic model and thus, the generic coordination model is divided into several pricing models 
according to the type of the pricing modeling, as we will see in the next section.   
2.4 Pricing models 
Different pricing approximation models based on fixed, piecewise, and polynomial 
strategies have been considered as alternatives to adjust the resource prices depending on the 
supplied quantities, and incorporated to the general coordinated optimization model: 
i. fixed pricing model 
In this case, the price policy of the third parties correspond to a fixed price, regardless 
of the quantity demanded over the planning time horizon, perfectly elastic demand (Figure 3). 
 , ',r e tP = fixed values (i.e. average approximation). 
Quantity demanded (Q)
P
ri
ce
 (
P
)
 
Figure  3-  Fixed price vs. demand 
ii. Polynomial pricing model 
Based on the price elasticity of demand theory, a polynomial trend may be adjusted 
(Figure 4) and the resource price can be computed as in Eq. (13), where ,a rx is a parameter 
which depends on the resource characteristics (initial price, supply capacity, demand 
elasticity, etc.).  
',, '
1
, , ,( )
A a
e a r r e t
A
r t
a
x Qp -
=
= ×å                                                                     
; ' ; ' ;r R e S e E t T" Î Î Î Î          
(13) 
Quantity demanded (Q)
Pr
ic
e 
(P
)
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Figure 4- Polynomial price vs. demand 
iii. Piecewise pricing model 
It is assumed that the quantity demanded Q is ordered once at any time node along the 
planning time horizon T (Figure 5). Different pricing zones (n=1, 2,…N) are offered by the 
third party depending on the quantity demanded 
, ',r e tQ at each time period, accordingly, Q has 
to fall in one of these Q1 , Q2 , (…), or Qn. 
PL
Qr,e’,t QL
Q1 QnQ2
Quantity Demanded (Q)
P
ri
ce
 (
P
)
y1 y2 yn
Pr,e’,t
                               
Figure 5- Piecewise price vs. demand 
To do so, binary variables (y1, y2… yn) have been used to allocate the quantity 
demanded to its price piece “zone” (Eq. 14).  
, ', , 1r e t n
n N
y
Î
£å
                                                                        ; ' ; ;e Sr E t TeR Î Î" Î Î                  
(14) 
Eq.15 identifies the resource quantities ranges (as constraints) and their 
correspondent binary variables, where , ', ,r e t nQL  is the maximum quantity demanded at price 
zone n.  
, ', , 1 ,, ', , , '', , , ', ,, ,r e t n r er e t n r e nt n r e t tnQL QN QLy y-× £ £ ×        ' ;; ;;e S er R t TE n NÎ Î" Î Î Î                                               (15)
The total external resource (3rd party) quantity can be computed as in Eq. 16; in which 
at any time node, 
, ',r e tQ is equal to , ',1r e tQ or , ',2r e tQ or , ',r e tQn  
, ',, ', ,r e t n
n
r
N
e tQ QN
Î
=å                                                                                    
; ' ; ;e Sr E t TeR Î Î" Î Î           
(16) 
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In this later case, the price elasticity coefficient 
' ,,,r e t nPE  is considered as in Gwartney 
et al. (2012) (Eq. 17). 
, ', ,
, '
, ' ,
,
,
,
%
%
r e t n
r e t n
r e t n
QN
PN
PE
D
=
D
                                                  ' ;; ;;e S er R t TE n NÎ Î" Î Î Î                                                (17) 
The resources price ܲܰ௥ǡ௘ᇲǡ௧ǡ௡ limits according to each pricing zone are calculated as in 
Eq. 18, where , ', ,r e t nPL  is the price constraint at any price zone. 
, ',, ', , , ', , , ', , 1 , ', ,,r e tr e t n r e t n r e t n r en t ny PL PL yPN -× £ £ ×             
' ; ;;;e S er R t TE n NÎ Î" Î Î Î    
(18) 
The resources price , ',r e tP  then is computed as in Eq. 19,  
, ',, ', ,r e t n
n
r
N
e tP PN
Î
=å                                                                                             
; ' ; ' ;r R e S e E t T" Î Î Î Î  
(19) 
The proposed pricing models resulting in LP (fixed pricing), NLP (polynomial pricing), 
and MINLP (piecewise pricing) formulations are solved to minimize the cost of the global 
system, so decisions are to be taken at each time node such as resource purchase levels and 
prices, storage levels, production levels, distribution levels, transportation flows and 
directions, etc.  
3. Case study 
The developed LP/NLP/MINLP pricing models have been implemented to a case study 
modified from the one proposed by Zamarripa et al. (2014). The global SC network (Figure 6) 
integrates a typical polystyrene production/distribution SC (SC1) and energy generation SC 
(SC2). One RM supplier of wood pellets (b1), petcock (b2), marc waste (b3), and coal (b4) 
feeds 6 energy generation plants (p1, p2… p6) (see Table 1). Four RM suppliers are competing 
to provide the polystyrene production plants (pl1, pl2, pl3) with alternative resources (rm1, 
rm2, rm3, rm4) in order to produce two final products: product A, and product B; rm1 and 
rm2 to produce product A, rm3 and rm4 to produce product B. The final products are stored 
in two distribution centers (dc1, dc2) and later distributed to the final polystyrene markets 
(m1, m2, m3) (Figure 5). The energy generation echelon SC has the possibility to sell energy to 
the electricity local network (Grid), and the polystyrene production-distribution SC has the 
possibility to purchase energy from the electricity local network (Grid). It has been assumed 
that there is a Wastewater Treatment Plant (WWTP) in the polystyrene production sites to 
treat the wastewater generated from the polystyrene production.  
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Figure 6- The global SC network 
Table 1. Energy SC parameters (energy generation echelon SCs) 
Energy required 
resource 
Energy production cost 
(€/kWh) 
Energy production ratio 
(kWh/kg RM) 
Gasification 
plants 
Combustion 
plants  
Gasification 
plants 
Combustion 
plants 
b1 (Wood pellets)  0.26 0.13 0.73 1.50 
b2 (Coal) 0.20 0.14 2.00 2.60 
b3 (Petcock) 0.21 0.15 0.85 1.80 
b4 (Marc waste)  0.23 0.135 0.80 2.00 
Table 2. Distance between suppliers and polystyrene production plants (km) 
Polystyrene 
SC supplier 
Distance to production 
plants (km) 
pl_1 pl_2 pl-3 
sup-1 100 150 145 
sup-2 200 120 130 
sup-3 110 70 80 
sup-4 170 220 215 
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3.1 Pricing models implementation 
Arbitrarily complex Price policies have been assumed to be known along the planning 
time horizon for each third party (based on current market prices ranges). These different 
pricing strategies have been approximated (Figures 7 & 8), resulting in four pricing models: 
average fixed, quartic polynomial, linear polynomial, and piecewise, to be used during the 
optimization of the planning decisions for the SC of interest.  
 
 
Figure 7- Polystyrene SC RM pricing trends 
a) rm1     b)  rm2    c) rm3     d) rm4 
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Figure 8- Energy SC RM pricing patterns 
a) wood pellets   b) petcock   c) marc waste   d) coal 
i) Fixed pricing model 
For the fixed pricing model, the average between the highest and the lowest real 
prices have been considered for each RM under study (Table 3).  
Table 3- Global SC RM fixed prices 
Fixed Prices 
Raw Materials Price (€/kg) 
rm1 1.00 
rm2 0.90 
rm3 0.90 
rm4 0.85 
b1 0.060 
b2 0.040 
b3 0.065 
b4 0.055 
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ii) Polynomial pricing models 
Two polynomial pricing strategies are analyzed here with different degrees: quartic 
polynomial (a polynomial of degree 4) and linear polynomial (a polynomial of degree 1) 
(Figures 7 and 8). Table 4 illustrates the parameters that substitute Eq. 8 in the proposed 
mathematical model. The polynomial parameters are obtained after adjusting the polynomial 
trends to each price policy. 
Table 4- RM polynomial-model parameters 
  Quartic Polynomial  Linear Polynomial  
  (A=5) (A=2) 
  x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x1 x2 
Polystyrene production  SC       
rm1 8.43E-25 7.61E-18 -5.03E-12 5.04E-09 1.155 -6.0E-07 1.15 
rm2 -2.32E-23 2.95E-17 -1.01E-11 1.43E-07 1.003 -8.5E-07 1.00 
rm3 -2.32E-23 2.95E-17 -1.01E-11 1.43E-07 1.003 -8.5E-07 1.00 
rm4 0 3.68E-17 -1.33E-11 -2.50E-07 1.007  -1.25E-6 1.00 
Energy generation  SC        
b1 -2.5E-29 8.82E-22 -4.05E-15 -2.89E-10 0.070 -4.0E-09 0.070 
b2 -3.6E-29 7.33E-22 -3.01E-15 1.26E-10 0.045 -2.6 E-09 0.045 
b3 -3.6E-29 1.03E-21 -4.54E-15 -1.54E-10 0.075 -4.5 E-09 0.075 
b4 -1.3E-29 7.36E-22 -3.56E-15 -4.25E-10 0.065 -4.0E-09 0.065 
iii) Piecewise linear pricing model 
Three pricing zones are assumed to be offered by the third parties for each RM feeding 
the SC of interest.  The price elasticity of demand for the first and the third prices zones (n=1 
& 3) is equal to zero, while the price elasticity of demand (PE) at price zone (n=2) has been 
considered as (-20) for all RMs feeding the polystyrene production SC, and (-25) for all RMs 
feeding the energy generation SC. Table 5 illustrates the prices and quantities ranges.  
Table 5- Piecewise-model parameters 
  RM price ranges (€/kg) RM purchased ranges (tons) 
 
max price   min price  
when price 
discount starts  
when price 
discount stops  
max supplier 
capacity Qmax   
Polystyrene 
production SC      
rm1 1.15 0.86 60 360 450 
rm2 1.00 0.75 45 270 300 
rm3 1.00 0.75 45 270 300 
rm4 1.00 0.70 30 210 240 
Energy 
generation SC      
b1 0.070 0.054 450 3,000 4,000 
b2 0.045 0.035 450 3,000 4,000 
b3 0.075 0.058 450 3,000 4,000 
b4 0.065 0.050 450 3,000 4,000 
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4. Results and discussion 
The proposed pricing models, within the coordination framework, have been solved 
for the above-mentioned case study, taking into consideration material/energy balances, 
processes availability, capacities and constraints, and tasks over a time horizon of 10 time 
periods; 1000 working hours each. The solution procedure is divided into two main steps:  
I) Optimization: Each pricing approximation is used to build a model which is 
optimized according to the established objective function (total cost), resulting 
in an optimal RM flow distribution Q from the 3rd parties over the discrete 
planning horizon for each pricing approximation.  
II) Simulation: These optimal RM distributions (from step I) are used to compute 
their real prices each time period (here, the 3rd party’s real prices policies are 
assumed as in Figures 7 and 8). Then, with the proposed Q distributions and 
their real prices, the pricing approximation models are simulated to obtain the 
associated total costs, so a comparison between the real expected costs is 
conducted.  
The resulting LP, NLP, and MINLP models have been modelled using GAMS and solved 
using Global mixed-integer quadratic optimizer “GloMIQO (Misener & Floudas, 2013)” 
on a Windows 7 computer  with Intel® Core™ i7-2600 CPU 3.40GHz processor with 
16.0 GB of RAM. The results show that the SCs coordination and the tactical decisions 
are affected by the quality of the price modeling selected.  
4.1 Results for SC1: Polystyrene production  
The pricing models affect the tactical decisions of SC1; the results show how the RM 
purchase levels vary according to the pricing modeling. The rm1 and rm2 suppliers (third 
parties) are competing to produce polystyrene product A, while rm3 and rm4 suppliers (third 
parties) are competing to supply for producing polystyrene product B. Figure 9 shows that 
rm2 and rm4 dominate the RM purchase levels using most of the pricing models, except in the 
piecewise model. The purchase levels of rm2 are the winners of the competence for all pricing 
models (Figure 9), as it has lower prices than rm1, and is the closest supplier to the 
dominating production plants (pl2 and pl3) (see Table 2 and Figure 11). The trend using the 
discount pricing models is to buy high amounts of RM to get higher discounts, getting the 
advantage of the storage centers to store the excess products for later distribution, as we will 
see in the next paragraphs. This can be seen clearly in the linear polynomial model (Figure 
9d); rm4 is purchased in most of the time periods at the supplier capacity level (240 tons), 
however, at time periods t1, t3, and t5, the decision is to buy from both rm3 and rm4 at their 
maximum supplying capacities to get the least possible prices, leading to not purchasing any 
of rm4 at time periods t4 and t10 suggesting to stop polystyrene B production (Figure 12d) at 
those time periods.  
From the other hand, the trend using the fixed price modeling is to buy RM all time 
periods (Figure 9a), as its decision does not take into account any discounts, and that is why 
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the purchase levels are distributed between all RMs along the planning time periods, except 
rm1 due to its highest price (Table 3). 
 
 
Figure 9- SC1 RM purchase levels 
  a) Fixed,   b) Piecewise,  c) Quartic Polynomial,  d) Linear Polynomial    
Analyzing the piecewise pricing model results (Figure 9b), rather than the other 
pricing models, rm3 dominates the SC1 RM purchase levels most of time periods, although it 
has higher prices than rm4, but with small difference (Figure 10b). Given the small price 
difference between them, the decision is to buy from the supplier whose capacity is 
dominated by rm3. At the contrary, rm2 dominates the SC1 RM purchase levels although it has 
less supplying capacity than rm1, but with large difference in the price (Figure 10a), so the 
decision here was to buy from rm2 supplier at the supplier capacity (300 tons) all time 
periods, except at t10; here it can be seen the trade-off between the supplier capacity and 
price. Nevertheless, buying rm2 at its supplier capacity most of the time periods leads to 
purchase very small amounts at time period t10 (16.4 tons), subsequently, this leads to 
produce very small amounts of polystyrene product A at t10 (16.2 tons) (see Figure 11b), 
getting the advantage of the stored products to satisfy the market demand at this time period.  
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Figure 10- Piecewise approximation analysis 
  a) RMs to produce product A   b) RMs to produce product B 
Producing polystyrene products A and B is the main task of the global SC. Since the RM 
purchase levels and their prices are degree of freedom variables, consequently, the pricing 
modeling affects the polystyrene production levels (Figures 11 & 12). Since the rm2 
dominates the RM purchase levels for product A. This behavior explains why the production 
profile of product A (Figure 11) follows the same rm2 purchase trends (Figure 9) in all pricing 
models. The type of RM purchased, also affects the choice to operate the polystyrene 
production plants (produce or not). For example, as the polystyrene production plant (pl2) is 
the closest to the rm2 supplier location (Table 2), it is also dominating the production of 
product A in all pricing models. 
Furthermore, the efficiency of the coordination in the supply chain is remarked in the 
solution of time period t10 (Figure 12b, c, & d); at this time period we can observe high final 
market demands, while the production plants and the purchase of raw materials rm2 are low. 
This operation scenario is due to the high raw material prices, while the product needs are 
being satisfied by the inventory levels (Figure 13b, c, & d). 
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Figure 11- Product A production levels 
  a) Fixed,   b) Piecewise,  c) Quartic Polynomial,  d) Linear Polynomial   
Regarding product B production decisions, polystyrene production plants pl1 and pl3 
dominate the product B production levels in most of the pricing models (Figure 12). Since rm4 
dominates the purchase levels for producing product B in most of the pricing models, and 
given that polystyrene plant pl1 is the closest to the rm4 supplier location (Table 2), pl1 
dominates the production levels in the pricing models where rm4 dominates the RM purchase 
levels. In the case of the piecewise model (Figure 12b), the pl1 plant highly dominates again 
the production of product B, especially for time periods t5, t7, t8 and t10, and these are the 
same time periods where rm4 is dominating the RM purchase levels (Figure 9b). 
When using the linear polynomial pricing model, the production plant pl2 is operating 
for the first time to produce product B (Figure 12d), besides the other plants, mainly in time 
periods t1, t3, and t5 to cope with the huge amounts of RM purchased in those time periods 
(see Figure 9d), since the polystyrene plant pl2 is the closest to the rm3 supplier (Table 2), 
thus showing the role of transport in the tactical decision-making.  
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Figure 12- Product B production levels 
  a) Fixed,   b) Piecewise,  c) Quartic Polynomial ,  d) Linear Polynomial   
The storage actions play a crucial role in this problem, since the pricing models drive 
the producers to buy higher amounts of raw materials in order to obtain higher discounts. The 
excess of the products is then stored to be distributed in future time periods. Figure 13 shows 
how the storage decisions are affected by the pricing modeling; the discounting models lead to 
higher storage (Figure 13b, c, & d) than the average fixed pricing model (Figure 13a), and that 
is due to the higher production levels exceeding the demands in order to cope with the huge 
amounts of RM purchased (see Figures 9, 11, & 12). And that explains why the linear 
polynomial model requires higher storage level (3802 tons) compared with (1721 tons, 1718 
tons, and 848 tons) regarding the quartic polynomial, piecewise, and fixed pricing models, 
respectively. The total storage of the polystyrene products resulting from the fixed pricing 
model is the lowest as its pricing strategy does not take into account any discounts and thus 
no need for much storage. 
It has been noticed that the storage levels of the product A-polystyrene resulting from 
the piecewise and the quartic polynomial models (Figure 13 b, c) are high at time periods (t7, 
t8, t9), where the production levels are high, and that the excess amounts will be distributed 
at time t10 where the production levels are very low (16.20 tons; 0.60 % of the total product 
A production): (Figures 11b, c).  
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Figure 13- SC1 storage levels 
  a) Fixed,   b) Piecewise,  c) Quartic Polynomial,  d) Linear Polynomial   
Figure 14 shows how the energy demanded internally (the coordination item) is also 
affected by the pricing modelling, leading to changes in the tactical decisions of the energy 
generation SC. The energy demanded by SC1 follows the trends of the polystyrene production 
levels that are already affected by the pricing modeling. For example, the internal energy 
demand obtained from the linear polynomial pricing model (Figure 14d) is very high at time 
periods t1, t3 and t5 due to the high polystyrene production levels (Figure 12d).  
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Figure 14- SC1 Internal energy demand 
a) Fixed,   b) Piecewise,  c) Quartic Polynomial,  d) Linear Polynomial 
Consequentially, the decision-making behavior of SC1 affects the tactical decisions of 
SC2. This can be clearly seen in the next section where the tactical decisions of SC2 are 
analyzed.  
4.2 Results for SC2: Energy generation 
The energy required by the polystyrene SC is provided from the energy SC according 
to the coordination requirements. Figure 15 shows how the energy generation of the energy 
plants are affected by the pricing modeling. In order to fulfill the energy demanded by the 
markets, as observed in Figure 14, the energy generation plants by combustion (p4, p5, and 
p6) dominate the energy generation in all pricing models, except in the linear polynomial 
model. On the other side, the gasification plants (p1, p2, and p3) are kept closed. Using the 
linear polynomial pricing model, requires the operation of gasification plants p1 and p2 at 
time periods (t1, t3, and t5), when the energy plants p4 and p5 exceed their generation 
capacities (1.5 GW) in order to cope with the huge energy demand at these time periods of 
SC1 (see Figure 14d), which requires buying high amounts of RM for SC1 (Figure 9d).  
It is also to be noticed that in Figures (15b & c), the quartic polynomial and piecewise 
models lead to similar energy generation patterns except at time period t6; the piecewise 
model requires the operation of energy plant p6 up to its generation capacity in order to fulfill 
the high energy demand resulting from the operation of the pl3 polystyrene plant at t6 due to 
the high amounts of purchased rm3 (see Figures 9b & 12b). Furthermore, the linear 
polynomial pricing model leads to a very small energy generation at time period t10 (128.05 
MWh; 0.32 % of the total energy demand), because the polystyrene production is very low 
due to the small amounts of purchased RM at this time period.  
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Figure 15- Energy generation levels 
a) Fixed,   b) Piecewise,  c) Quartic Polynomial,  d) Linear Polynomial 
Consequently, the SC2 RM purchase decisions are affected by the pricing modelling as 
it is illustrated in Figure 16. To meet the energy demand of the markets, the decision is in 
favor of the RM b2 (coal) which has been purchased in different quantities along the time 
periods depending on the pricing models. By reading Figure 16, it is noticed that the RM 
decisions suggested by the linear polynomial pricing model are different following the energy 
generation demands, especially at t1, t3, and t5 where the RM levels purchased for SC1 are the 
highest, resulting in demanding more energy (see Figures 9d and 14d). It should also be 
noticed that at time period t10, the discounting models result in very low purchase amounts 
of b2; 660 tons for both pricing models piecewise and the quartic polynomial, and 49 tons 
using the linear polynomial model. The total amounts of RM purchased for SC2 according to 
the linear polynomial pricing model are the highest (16,042 tons), compared with 15,516 tons 
resulting from the other pricing models. 
The reason behind the dominance of b2, for all pricing models, is that the energy 
generation decisions lead to the operation of the energy plants (p4, p5, and p6), where b2 has 
the highest efficiency (2.6kWh/kg) compared with b1 (1.5kWh/kg), which has the lowest 
price (0.13 €/kWh) (see Table 1), thus we can realize the trade-off between the prices and 
efficiencies.  
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Figure 16- SC2 RM purchase levels  
4.3 Economic assessment 
The decisions obtained according to each pricing model have been used to assess the 
expected results assuming a perfect information system. To do so, the RM purchase decisions 
resulting from the different pricing models (as in Figures 9 & 16) have been allocated to their 
real prices (Figures 7 & 8), and the pricing models have been simulated based on the optimal 
RM purchase decisions and the corresponding real prices. Here it is worth mentioning that the 
real price policy that the 3rd party will follow according to the quantity demanded by the 
centralized SC enterprise may have a very complex behavior. Since these real policies may be 
hard to be integrated in the mathematical model of the centralized SC superstructure, 
different pricing approximation models are proposed to obtain the optimal quantities to be 
purchased. In order to compare these approximations, the real total costs (the SC costs 
considering the original price policy) are computed for the different optimum purchase 
proposals obtained from each approximation. 
Figure 17 and Table 6 illustrate the SC total Cost obtained from the pricing 
approximation models comparing with the SC real total cost. It can be noticed that the quartic 
polynomial and the piecewise pricing models lead to the lowest real total costs (M€16.42), 
while the linear polynomial and the fixed pricing models lead to the highest real total costs; 
M€16.58 and M€ 16.57. The average fixed pricing model leads to the highest RM purchase 
cost (M€ 5.08); 4.3 %, 6.4%, and 3.5 % comparing with the quartic polynomial, linear 
polynomial, and piecewise pricing models, respectively, as its decisions do not take into 
account any price discounts, without allowing any flexibility in the third party decisions. 
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Figure 17- Global SC pricing and real Total Cost 
From the models statistics in Table 6, it can be noticed that higher computational 
effort is needed for solving the piecewise model (5.8 sec), comparing with 0.05 CPU sec 
regarding the fixed pricing model.  
Table 6- Global SC models statistics 
            Total Cost (M€) 
  
Model 
Single 
equations 
Single 
variables 
Discrete 
variables 
CPU 
(sec) 
Pricing  Real  
Fixed  LP 2,752 4,991 - 0.05 17.00 16.57 
Quartic 
Polynomial  NLP 2,952 5,191 - 0.13 16.26 16.42 
Linear 
Polynomial  NLP 2,952 5,191 - 0.11 16.49 16.58 
Piecewise MINLP 3,336 5,495 240 5.80 16.26 16.42 
Given that the best pricing approximations need more computing effort than the fixed 
pricing approach, the question arising here is: Is it possible to find a fixed pricing model that 
can be used to obtain better solutions than the average fixed pricing approximation? In order 
to answer this question, different fixed pricing approximation models have been proposed to 
estimate the real pricing policies. The real pricing patterns were divided into fixed ranges; 
max (F1), two intermediates (F2 & F4), min (F5), besides the average fixed model analyzed 
before (F3). The fixed pricing model has been solved five times (F1-F5), and the optimal RM 
purchased decisions of each fixed pricing model were used as input for the simulation step 
(RM purchase decisions vs. real prices), separately.  
Table 7 and Figure 18 show the real Total Costs of the global SC resulting from each 
fixed pricing decisions. The fixed pricing model (F4) leads to the best approximation, with a 
real total cost (M€ 16.42), which is similar to the results of the piecewise and the quartic 
polynomial real costs that have been obtained before (Table 6). Unlike what was expected, the 
average approximation of the real prices (F3) leads to the worst real Total Cost (M€ 16.57). 
Table 7- Global SC fixed pricing and real Total Costs 
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  Pricing  Real  
F1 18.04 16.44 
F2 17.68 16.43 
F3 17.00 16.57 
F4 16.54 16.42 
F5 16.09 16.47 
 
 
Figure 18- Global SC fixed pricing model vs real Total Costs 
5. Conclusions  
A generic coordinated production- distribution tactical model considering third parties price 
policies as degree of freedom decisions is developed. Different pricing approximation models 
(fixed, piecewise, and polynomial) have been proposed for a multi-site multi-echelon multi-
product SC (coordinated and centralized), resulting in several LP, NLP, and MINLP models. 
The effects of using the different proposed pricing models on the SCs coordination have been 
verified through a case study that coordinates two main SCs: polystyrene 
production/distribution SC and its energy generation SC. The results show that different 
pricing approximations lead to significantly different tactical decisions and economic results. 
The trend in the piecewise and polynomial models is to purchase higher amounts of RMs in 
order to get lower prices, taking the advantage of storage in order to store the excess amounts 
of products for later distribution, resulting in different economic performance. The best 
pricing approximation model is found to be in favor of the piecewise approach, leading to 
significant improvements (4.6 %, in the presented case study, in terms of total cost, compared 
with the average approximation model), although its use requires more computational effort; 
accordingly, average pricing approximations are not recommended. Flexible pricing 
approaches within a coordination management give the third parties enough freedom to 
control their financial flows and thus to compete in the global market management. 
Furthermore, the generality of the presented tactical based model, derived from considering 
the echelons SCs as sets in the mathematical formulations and synchronizing the supply and 
demand of the interacting echelons, gives more flexibility to cope with further supply chain 
echelons, where each echelon can play different roles: a supplier on one hand and a 
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manufacturer on the other hand. In this sense, pricing models can be extended to be used for 
decentralized SCs as a basis for further price negotiations. 
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Acronyms  
CEFIC European Chemicals Industry Council 
CPU Central Processing Unit 
DC Distribution Center 
EPCA  European Petrochemical Association 
GAMS The General Algebraic Modeling System 
GB Gigabyte 
GHz Gigahertz 
LP Linear Programming 
MIP Mixed Integer Programming 
MILP Mixed Integer Linear Programming 
MINLP Mixed Integer Non-Linear Programming 
NLP Non-Linear Programming 
PSE Process System Engineering 
RM Raw Material 
SC Supply Chain 
SCM Supply Chain Management 
SCsCo Supply Chains Coordination 
  
Nomenclature  
Indexes  
E Echelon 
R Resource (raw material, product, energy, cash, …) 
T time period 
Sets  
dc Distribution center 
e echelon 
m external markets (final consumers) 
pl Production plant 
r  resources (raw materials, products, steam…) 
s external suppliers  
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t time periods 
Parameters  
,r edist  travel distance of resource r at echelon e 
, , ,r e e tdmd ¢  external demand of resource r in echelon e’ (final consumer) at time t 
, ', ,r e t nPE                            price elasticity of demand or resource r in echelon e’ at time t in price zone n 
, ,r r eprf ¢   production factor: quantity of resource r required to produce resource r' in echelon e 
min
,e tPRD  minimum production capacity in echelon e, time t 
max
,e tPRD  maximum production capacity of echelon e, time t 
, ', ,r e t nPL  max price at piecewise price zone n, time t 
, ', ,r e t nQL   resource r limit in price zone n at echelon e (external supplier) , time t 
, ,r e trp ¢     unitary retail price of resource r at echelon ݁ ǡ(final consumer), time t 
min
,e tST  minimum storage capacity at echelon e, time t 
max
,e tST  maximum storage capacity at echelon e, time t 
,r eust  Unit storage cost of resource r at echelon e 
,r euprd  unit production cost of resource r at echelon e 
,r eutr  unit transport cost of resource r at echelon e 
,a rx   factor depends on the polynomial grade a of resource r  
Variables:  
COST   total cost of the centralized SC 
eCOST   Cost of echelon e 
eCPR   production cost at echelon e 
eCRM   cost of the externally supplied resources at echelon e 
eCST   storage cost at echelon e 
eCTR   transport cost at echelon e 
, , ,r e e tD ¢  amount of resource r delivered from echelon e to echelon e' (final market) at time t  
, ,r e tDmi ¢  internal demand of resource ݎ ǡ at echelon e , time t 
, ', ,r e t nPN   Elastic price of resource r at echelon e (external supplier) in price zone n, time t 
, ',r e tP   Price of resource r at echelon e (external supplier), time t 
, ,r e tprod  production levels of resource r in echelon e, time t 
PROF   aggregated profit of the global SC network 
, ', ,r e e tQE  resource r from third party echelon e’ to each echelon e, time t 
, ',r e tQ  total resource r from third party e’, time t 
, ', ,r e t nQN  resource r purchased from 3rd party e’ in price zone n , time t 
, ,r e tQR  resource r flows between entities at echelon e, time t  
, ,r e tST  Storage levels of resource r at echelon e, time t 
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eSALE   economic sales (income) of echelon e 
Binary 
Variables 
 
, , ,r e t ny   Binary variable of price piece n of resource r at echelon e (external supplier), time t 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
